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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS
Appellants argue in Point I of their Reply Brief that in
fact and substance U.C.A. 25-1-4 was raised at the trial court
level. The lower court memorandum makes reference to the fact that
actual fraudulent intent need not be shown and includes with it
two Utah Supreme Court cases that analyze U.C.A. 25-1-4.
Point II argues in three subsections that there is
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abundant evidence of a fraudulent intent including the Cavanaugh's
own testimony, the written opinion of Judge Rokich, and the action
of the bankruptcy trustee in voiding the trust himself.
Point III argues that the issues of "insolvency" and
"inability to pay debts as they become due," are dependant on the
outcome of the then existing Cavanaugh vs. Walker litigation. The
filing of bankruptcy after judgment was rendered evidences both
insolvency and an inability to pay debts by Cavanaugh.
Point IV argues against the position taken by appellee that
the Geary case applies to this case. Appellant contends that Leach
v. Anderson opens the way to apply U.C.A. 25-1-11 to real property
as well as personal property.
REPLY ARGUMENTS
POINT I. APPELLEE ERRORS IN ASSERTING THAT WALKER IS RAISING
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 25-1-4 OF THE PRE-1988 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STATUTE.
The issue of fraudulent conveyance as stated in U. C
1-4 was raised to the trial court below.

The

A. 25-

"Memorandum

Regarding,Supplemental Proceedings On Transfer Of Property Pending
Litigation," (R-392-402), filed by appellant with the trial court
on or about December 7, 1987, makes a specific point of arguing
that actual fraudulent intent to avoid creditors need not be
proven. This supplemental proceeding memorandum raises two Utah
Supreme Court cases that discuss U.C.A. 25-1-4, (1) First Security
- 4 -

Bank of Utah vs. Vrontikas Brothers, Inc.P 409 P.2nd 1301 (1971)
and (2) Dahnken vs. Wilmarth, 726 p.2nd 4 20. Courtesy copies of
these two case were hand delivered to Judge Rokich with the
supplemental memorandum. (R-398). The Dahnken case has at it's
core the U.C.A. 25-1-4 statute. The Vrontikas case makes reference
to this same U.C.A. 25-1-4 statute. Portions of page 8 and 9 of
the supplemental proceedings memorandum (R-397-398) are reproduced
here verbatim for easy reference and added argument:
" By analogy, the Utah Supreme Court case of First Security
Bank of Utah vs. Vrontikas Brothers. Inc. . 409 P2nd 1301 (1971) is
also directly applicable to this case. In the First Security Bank
case, property was transferred without consideration and would
have had the effect of denying creditors the right to recover
lawful claims. The District Court set aside the transfer and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
In the present case, Cavanaughs both testified that no
consideration was given for the transfer of the trust property
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. The Supreme Court has made it
clear in regards to these cases that a transfer of assets to avoid
creditors without consideration is invalid as to legitimate
judgments and creditor's claims.
It is also cle^ar by case law that actual fraudulent intent to
avoid creditors need not be proven. It is sufficient to show that
the trust was created without consideration for the use and
benefit of the person creating the trust, and to the detriment of
creditors. See First Security Bank at 490 P2nd page 1302, Dahnken
vs. Wilmarth 726 P2nd 420, and Leach vs. Anderson."
The above quote with its reference to two Utah Supreme Court cases
that deal with U. C. A. 25-1-4 and the reference to the fact that
no actual fraudulent intent need be proven raised before Judge
Rokich the substance of the conveyance argument of 25-1-4.
- 5 -

Appellant points out that the issue on appeal was raised at
a supplemental hearing that took place six months after the jury
trial was concluded in Walker's favor. This issue could not be
raised at trial but came only to light after the trial. Appellant
is not seeking to raise a new issue on appeal, but merely
elaborates the issues presented below at a post trial motion.
It is true that the greater focus at the trial court supplemental
hearing was on U.C.A. 25-1-11, but it is inaccurate to say that
U.C.A. 25-1-4 was never raised at all. The case law submitted to
Judge Rokich raises U.C.A. 25-1-4 and it is in fact argued,
however briefly.
Furthermore, the entire substance of the post trial motion
was the issue of fraudulent conveyance to a trust to avoid
creditors. All arguments before this Court that go to the issue of
fraudulent conveyance were in substance argued below and should be
considered now.
POINT II. THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT INTENT
BY THE CAVANAUGHS TO TRANSFER ASSETS TO DEFRAUD THIS CREDITOR.
A. THE CAVANAUGH'S OWN TESTIMONY IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE
SUPPLEMENTAL HEARING SUPPORTS A FINDING OF FRAUDULENT INTENT.
The appellee argues on page eight of their brief that, " The
Facts Do Not Support an Inference Of Fraudulent Intent." Appellant
contends that this argument is totally without merit. Dahnken,
Inc. Of Salt Lake City, v. Wilmarth, 726 P. 2nd 420 at 423, sets
- 6 -

forth the "badges of fraud," that are to be used to infer
fraudulent intent. Those badges of fraud are previously cited on
page 15 of Appellant's Brief and discussed in detail. Simply
restated

here, they

are; (1) continuing

in possession, (2)

anticipating litigation, and (3) conveying to a family member
without consideration.
Appellant asks this Court to once again look at these three
badges of fraud through the Cavanaughs own testimony. Since the
filing of the Appellant's brief, the appellee by motion with a
subsequent Order has had the transcript of the hearing before
Judge Rokich made a part of the record. Appellant will refer
directly to the testimony from that transcript to show that all
the above stated Dahnken badges of fraud are cleiarly present.
First, on continuing

in possession

and evidencing the

perquisites of ownership, Mr. Cavanaugh read into the record the
controlling Trust language, as follows;
"As long as the undersigned is alive, the grantor
reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this trust
concerning the property and the trust to the property in
whole or in part, including the principal and present or
past undistributed income from such principal."
Immediately thereafter, Mr Cavanaugh was asked;
Q. "Isn't it true that Violet P. Cavanaugh has the right to
amend, modify, revoke the trust in whole or in part for as long as
she's alive?
- 7 -

A. "That's true."
(Hearing transcript page 9 line 17 to page 10 line 8)
Mr. Cavanaugh was then asked;.
Q. "And if there are benefits that are received through the
trust, who is the beneficiary of those proceeds, of those
benefits?"
A. "It would be Violet P. Cavanaugh, I assume. It's her
trust."
(Hearing transcript page 12 line 12 to line 16)
Q. "But is it your understanding that Violet P. Cavanaugh can
then use those trust fund benefits in any way she wants?"
A. "She can."
(Hearing transcript page 13 line 5 to line 8)
Mrs. Cavanaugh was then examined with respect to the trust
benefits. Her testimony is found on page 17 line 22 through page
18 line 19 of the hearing transcript as follows;
Q. " Mrs. Cavanaugh, are you familiar with the Violet P.
Cavanaugh trust that is the subject of this hearing?"
A. " Yes, I am."
Q. " And are you the trustee in that trust?"
A. "Now, what we have— Yes, I guess so."
Q. "Mrs. Cavanaugh, is it your understanding that you have
full power to

—
- 8 -

A. "Yes."
Q. —revoke the trust."
A. "Yes. I have full power of the trust."
Q. "And that you have full power over the use of the
proceeds—
A. "Yes."
Q. — o f the trust."
A. "Yes, I understand that."
Q. "And that all of the benefits received by the trust come
to you to be disbursed or used as you see fit?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And you have that power as long as you7re alive; is that
correct?"
A. "Yes, I understand that."
It is evident from this questioning that Mrs. Cavanaugh, who
is also the judgment debtor of Mr. Walker, retained full power,
control, rights and benefits of the trust property, and but for
her bankruptcy would have continued to do so for as long as she
lived. There is no greater prerequisite of property ownership than
full and complete power of control. The first badge of fraud is
fully satisfied.
Secondly, on the issue of making a conveyance in anticipation
of litigation, consider again the testimony of Mr. Cavanaugh;
- 9 -

Q. " With regard to the three pieces of property that you
have just mentioned and the promissory note, when were those
assets transferred into the trust?"
A. Date of the trust is March 20th, 1986."
Q. And that is after the commencement of the legal action
that is—that we have been to trial on; is that correct?"
A. "I believe it is."
(Hearing transcript page 4 line 25 to page 5 line 7)
Legal action by Mr. Cavanaugh had commenced, a promissory
note owing to Mr. Walker by Mr. Cavanaugh in a sum exceeding
$420,000 was long past due, counterclaims were imminent. The
argument of appellee that the transfer of property to trust was
not in anticipation of litigation is unfounded and unpersuasive.
The third badge of fraud from Dahnken contemplates no
consideration with the transfer going to a family member. There
can be no dispute that Mrs. Cavanaugh

is the wife of Mr.

Cavanaugh, thus satisfying the family member point. Now consider
this testimony of Mr. Cavanaugh at the hearing;
Q. "When you transferred the property into the Violet P.
Cavanaugh trust, did you receive any consideration other than the
tax benefits that you briefly alluded to?"
A. "Did I?'
Q. "Yes"
- 10 -

A. "No."
Q. "Did your wife?"
A. "No."
(Hearing transcript page 11 line 1 through line 9)
Even the tax benefits, if any, go to Mrs. Cavanaugh as she
receives all benefits from and has all control over the trust.
There was, without dispute, no consideration

given

for the

transfer of the trust property. Judge Rokich specifically stated
so in his written decision on page 2 pagaraph 1. (R-398).
all

of the badges of

fraud

are present by virtue

Thus

of the

Cavanaugh's own testimony.
Appellee argues that because Cavanaughs have stated that in
their subjective intent they did not intend to defraud by their
conveyance, that there was no fraud. Appellee expects Mr. Walker
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subjective
intent of Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh was to so defraud. This is an
impossible burden etbsent a confession by the Cavanaughs themselves
and is not the requirement of the law.

Wctlker has done all that

the law requires by showing that all the badges of fraud are
present. This burden has been confirmed by Judge Rokich.
B. THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JUDGE ROCKICH SPECIFICALLY STATES
THAT THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST WAS CREATED TO THE DETRIMENT
OF HER CREDITORS.
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The memorandum decision of Judge Rokich strongly indicates
that a fraudulent intent was present. On that basis he invalidated
the trust as to all personal property. In the memorandum decision,
Judge Rokich spells out in clear and convincing language through
nine separate points that all of the badges of fraud are present
in this case. Judge Rokich then states, "There is no question that
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was created for her own use and
benefit and to the detriment of her creditors." (Emphasis added,
R-390, and page 3 of the memorandum decision of Judge Rokich,
addendum A to appellant's brief.)

The Substituted Plaintiff and

Respondent, with all respect, were not present through this case
and have not seen the obvious indicia of fraudulent intent that
pervades. Judge Rokich has left the record clear by specifically
stating

that

the

trust

was

created

"to

the

detriment

of

creditors."
The problem with the decision of Judge Rokich, and the
reason for the appeal, is that he decided the issue of real
property separately and on the unwarranted precedent of Geary v.
Cain. Judge Rokich stated in his written opinion; "If it were not
for the Geary case the court would be inclined to invalidate the
trust as to the real property also." (R-391, and Addendum A to
appellant's brief, last sentence). The only reason Judge Rokich
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did not invalidate the trust as to all property was the language
of the Geary case.
C. THE SUBSTITUTED PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT, AS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE,
VOIDED THE CAVANAUGH TRUST IN ORDER TO REACH THE ASSETS.
The substituted plaintiff, or appellee, argues that the
Violet P. Cavanaugh trust is valid as against Walker's jury
awarded judgment be^cause there is no actual fraudulent intent. At
the same time, the substituted plaintiff, on the theory of
invalidating

fraudulent

trusts

to

protect

creditors,

has

invalidated the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust in his capacity as
Bankruptcy Trustee. Appellee invalidated the trust to reach the
very assets that he now seeks to prevent Walker from obtaining.
The Bankruptcy Trustee uses the law of fraudulent conveyance to
grasp the Cavanaugh assets and then argues that Walker does not
have the law of fraudulent conveyance to recover the same assets.
Stated another way, the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust could not have
been a valid trust or else the Bankruptcy trustee could not have
invalidated it in the first place and made it's assets a part of
the bankruptcy estate.
There must have been clear and convincing evidence of a
fraudulent conveyance because the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust was
invalidated by the substituted plaintiff when the Cavanaughs filed
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy trustee is, in his cippellee's brief,
- 13 -

arguing against the very basis that allowed him to reach the
Cavanaugh's assets to begin with. This element of double standard
being employed by the substituted plaintiff and respondent is
without logic or equity.

POINT III.
ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, CAVANAUGHS BECOMING
INSOLVENT AND BEING ABOUT TO INCUR DEBTS BEYOND THEIR ABILITY TO
PAY WERE BOTH ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE FACT THAT LITIGATION WAS
PENDING AND A LARGE JUDGMENT IN WALKER'S FAVOR WAS IMMINENT.
Appellee argues in Point I B. on page 6 of their brief that
the record does not reflect that Violet Cavanaugh was insolvent at
the time of the creation the trust. Along the same theory,
Appellee argues in Point IV on page 11 of their brief that the
Cavanaughs did not believe that they were about to incur debts
beyond their ability to pay them. These legal theories are founded
on the statutory language of now repealed U.C.A. 25-1-4 and 25-1-6
respectively. However, under the facts of the present case, these
two points raise the same basic argument that is contemplated in
the common law theory of conveyance of property in anticipation of
litigation, as set forth in the Dahnken case. That is, whether
Cavanaughs are insolvent at the time of the creation of the trust,
or whether Cavanaughs are about to incur debts beyond their
ability

to pay, depends on the net result of the pending

litigation between Cavanaughs and Walker. But look to the bottom
line. Cavanaughs filed bankruptcy as soon as Walker got his
- 14 -

judgment
property.

and

begcin to

collect

on

it

against

the

personal

Filing bankruptcy assumes both insolvency and the

inability to pay debts as they become due.
On the other hand, the appellee argues to this Court that
because Cavanaughs did not "believe" that they were insolvent at
the exact time the trust was created, and because at the moment
the trust was created they did not have debts beyond their ability
to pay, the statutory language of 25-1-4 and 25-1-6 do not apply
and the conveyance is valid.

The law can not and should not be

viewed so narrowly and applied so restrictively. From both the
viewpoint of law and equity it is sufficient to show that
litigation was unde>rway, the judgment debtor was unable to pay his
creditor and bankruptcy was thereafter filed. Accordingly, both
Point I B. and Point IV of appellee7s brief are not persuasive and
should be dismissed.
POINT IV. THE GEARY V. CAIN CASE, OF 1932, IS NOT THE CONTROLLING
LAW OF THESE FACTS AND WAS NOT CORRECTLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE.
Appellant argues that Geary v. Cain should not be applied to
the facts of this case. Appellee argues that Geary is right on
point. Resolution therefore requires the court to review the Geary
case in light of the facts presented. Appellant reiterates that
Geary is distinguished because the conveyances were made outright,
to a separate legal entity, the Doris Trust Co., and far in
- 15 -

advance of any litigation. The facts established that the debtor
did not own the real estate so transferred, but owned just one
share of stock of the Doris Trust Company Furthermore, there was
no written trust agreement between the parties and the court
therefore dismissed any theory of transfer in trust. The court
concluded that because the conveyance was valid and there was no
written trust agreement, the real property in question could not
be executed upon. The substance of the decision had nothing to do
with the fraudulent conveyance statute. To apply the Geary case to
the facts of this case is simply wrong.
It is Leach vs. Anderson. 535 P2nd 1241 (Utah 1975) that
raises the inference that U.C.A. 25-1-11 applies to real estate as
well as personal property. Justice Crockett notes, "The statute is
but a codification of the common law, which for reasons discussed
herein, refused to give recognition to trusts of this character
involving any kind of property." (Emphasis added, 535 P.2nd at
1244.) If indeed the statute is but a codification of the common
law, as stated by Justice Crockett in Leach, then it makes no
sense to strictly construe the statute against the common law
thereby preventing Mr. Walker from collecting his judgment.
The footnote to the above quote reinforces this more rational
construction by stating that a trust for the benefit of the
grantor is uniformly held entirely invalid.
- 16 -

CONCLUSION
Appellee

seeks

through

a

maze

of

technicalities

and

restrictive interpretations to thwart the obvious justice of
allowing Mr. Walker to collect his jury awarded judgment.
The simple facts and substance of the law require that this lawful
judgment creditor be paid. It is respectfully requested that the
lower court's order only partially invalidating the trust be
reversed and an order entered allowing Mr. Walker's judgment to
attach as a judgment lien as of the date judgment w^s entered.
Dated this 21st day of Octobe/^Z99^
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